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TunnelAbstract VoIP usage is rapidly growing due to its cost effectiveness, dramatic functionality over
the traditional telephone network and its compatibility with public switched telephone network
(PSTN). In some countries, like Pakistan, the commercial usage of VoIP is prohibited. Internet
service providers (ISPs) and telecommunication authorities are interested in detecting VoIP calls
to either block or prioritize them. So detection of VoIP calls is important for both types of
authorities. Signature-based, port-based, and pattern-based VoIP detection techniques are
inefﬁcient due to complex and conﬁdential security and tunneling mechanisms used by VoIP. In this
paper, we propose a generic, robust, efﬁcient, and practically implementable statistical analysis-
based solution to identify encrypted, non-encrypted, or tunneled VoIP media (voice) ﬂows using
threshold values of ﬂow statistical parameters. We have made a comparison with existing
techniques and evaluated our system with respect to accuracy and efﬁciency. Our system has
97.54% direct rate and .00015% false positive rate.
ª 2015 The Author. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of King Saud University. This is
an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Voice over Internet protocol (VoIP) is a mechanism that sends
voice over the IP based network. Use of VoIP for commercial
purpose is growing day by day due to the advantages of cost
effectiveness, functionality over the traditional telephone net-
work and its compatibility with PSTN. The main steps that
are involved in VoIP call setup are signaling and media chan-
nel setup. The signaling is used to setup connection betweentwo communicating parties. The media channel setup is the
actual voice transmission channel between two parties after a
successful signaling; it includes digitization of voice, encoding,
packetization and transmission of the voice packets over the
packet switched network. SIP and H.323 are mostly used sig-
naling protocols and RTP is mostly used media transmission
protocol. Some detection methods are applied on signaling
trafﬁc and others on media trafﬁc. There are also some meth-
ods that examine both signaling and media trafﬁc. VoIP sig-
naling and media transmission both may be encrypted or
any one may only be encrypted. The media session may be
encrypted by SRTP, SSL/TLS, IPSec, or propriety protocols.
The signaling may be encrypted by SIPS, SSL/TLS, SMIME,
IPSec, or propriety protocols. Port-based, signature-based,
pattern-based VoIP detection techniques are inefﬁcient due
to complex, conﬁdential and secure privacy protocols used
306 M. Mazhar U. Rathoreby VoIP. Moreover these techniques are speciﬁc to VoIP appli-
cations or protocols. Statistical analysis-based techniques are
generic and can detect VoIP hidden in secure tunnels. So we
are proposing a statistical analysis based solution for VoIP call
detection.
Detection of VoIP trafﬁc is important by two aspects; one
for blocking or restricting commercial usage of VoIP, other
for prioritizing it. In some countries, like Pakistan, use of
VoIP for commercial purposes is prohibited as it incurs loss
of a large amount of money to the national telecom operator.
In spite of this, a signiﬁcant amount of data trafﬁc traveling
through the internet today is commercial VoIP. Pakistan
Telecom Authority (PTA), being the regulatory telecom
authority of Pakistan, is interested in detecting the commercial
use of VoIP and punish illegal operators. On the other hand,
ISPs or other service providers may also want to prioritize
VoIP for the paying customers. Multiple solutions (Li et al.,
2010; Li et al., 2010; Idrees and Aslam Khan, 2008; Freire
et al., 2008; Yildirim and Radcliffe, 2010; Maiolini et al.,
2009; Nguyen and Armitage, 2008; Yildirim and Radcliffe,
2010; Lin et al., 2009; Dusi et al., 2009; Alshammari and
Zincir-Heywood, 2011; Li et al., 2007; Rossi et al., 2008;
Bonﬁglio et al., 2008; Alshammari and Zincir-Heywood,
2010) exist for detecting encrypted VoIP but they are neither
suitable for telecom authorities and ISPs to detect VoIP calls
irrespective of VoIP application nor have good results in case
of encrypted and tunneled VoIP detection. Some of them are
not generic, others could not provide real time detection. In
this paper, we propose a statistical analysis-based solution
using threshold values of ﬂow statistical parameters to identify
the VoIP media (voice) ﬂows. The solution is generic, efﬁcient,
accurate and real time (to some extent) and detects encrypted,
non-encrypted, and tunneled VoIP. It is independent from any
VoIP application, protocol, security mechanism, or tunneling
mechanism and practically implementable at telecommunica-
tion authority or ISP gateway to either block or prioritize
VoIP trafﬁc. Fig. 1 shows the network model of our proposed
solution. Our solution can be implemented on any network
device such as router, telecommunication/ISP gateways, ser-
vers etc. as in Fig. 1. (IP Phone1, D2) and (C3, D4) are IP pairsFig. 1 Network model of threshold-based generic scheme forthat communicate voice and rest of the terminals sent non-
voice trafﬁc. Our solution will detect IP Phone1:D2 and
C3:D4 ﬂows as voice ﬂows.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 dis-
cusses the work that has been done in VoIP detection.
Section 3 represents the datasets that are analyzed and tested.
Section 4 presents the statistical analysis. The proposed system
is discussed in Section 5. Evaluation and results are shown and
comparison is made in Section 6. Section 7 concludes the work.
2. Background and related work
There are basically 4 types of VoIP detection techniques as
mentioned by Rathore and Mehmood (2012), i.e. Port-based,
signature-based, pattern-based, and statistical analysis-based
techniques. By port-based analysis techniques, the trafﬁc is
classiﬁed by examining port number at the transport layer.
IANA speciﬁed some standard ports to speciﬁc applications
such as VoIP uses 5060, 5061 ports for SIP signaling, 1718
to 1720 for H.323 signaling, and port 2427, 2944 for media
gateway control protocol (MGCP), H.248 and Megaco proto-
cols. In Leung and Chan (2007), Baset and Schulzrinne (2006),
port-based analysis are used as helping information to detect
VoIP. By Renals and Jacoby (2009), Skype VoIP trafﬁc is
detected by matching distinct Skype keywords, ports, and con-
tent. Usage of non standard and dynamical allocation of ports
makes port-based detection inefﬁcient.
Signature-based techniques detect VoIP using deep packet
inspection by matching speciﬁc strings within packet payload.
SIP packet has string ‘‘sip’’ within packet payload. RTP
header mostly starts with 0x80, 0x81. ZRTP packet contains
‘‘1000xxxx5a525450’’ at the start of pay load (ZRTP header).
In Renals and Jacoby (2009), Skype VoIP trafﬁc is detected
by matching distinct contents as well. By Renals and Jacoby
(2009) Skype packets sometimes contain the keywords ‘‘/getla
testversion?ver=’’ or ‘‘/getnewestversion’’ combined with
‘‘/ui/’’ string. By Renals and Jacoby (2009), the outgoing data
packets of Skype contain content ‘‘16 03 01 00 00’’, the incom-
ing packets have content ‘‘17 03 01 00 00’’ and if the packet of
these contents is blocked, Skype tries to send a new packet thatencrypted and tunneled Voice Detection over IP Networks.
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01 17 03 01 00’’. Detection of VoIP in Adami et al. (2009), Lu
et al. (2010), Birke et al. (2010) also used signature-based tech-
nique. Use of encrypted and tunneling mechanism in VoIP
makes signature-based techniques inaccurate. Moreover signa-
tures vary from application to application and protocol to
protocol.
By pattern-based analysis, the particular pattern of signal-
ing communication of different VoIP applications is to be
identiﬁed. Many researches (Leung and Chan, 2007; Baset
and Schulzrinne, 2006; Lu et al., 2010; Peranyi and Molnar,
2007) have been done for detecting Skype trafﬁc by pattern
analysis. By investigating Skype, the paper (Leung and
Chan, 2007) discuss 15 basic stages of Skype communication
from start to end such as start up, registration, etc. and also
reveals all the entities and nodes that are participating in con-
versation such as Skype client, super node (SN), etc. Pattern-
based techniques depend on signaling mechanism that is varied
from application to application and protocol to protocol.
Statistical analysis-based techniques are generic and can be
used for encrypted and tunneled trafﬁc. Statistical analysis are
mostly performed on voice data by taking ﬂow features as
input such as packet size, arrival time, etc. The techniques
(Li et al., 2010; Li et al., 2010; Idrees and Aslam Khan,
2008; Freire et al., 2008; Yildirim and Radcliffe, 2010;
Maiolini et al., 2009; Nguyen and Armitage, 2008; Yildirim
and Radcliffe, 2010; Lin et al., 2009; Dusi et al., 2009;
Alshammari and Zincir-Heywood, 2011; Li et al., 2007;
Rossi et al., 2008; Bonﬁglio et al., 2008; Alshammari and
Zincir-Heywood, 2010) are statistical approaches to detect
VoIP. In Li et al. (2010), the IP addresses and ports are exam-
ined. In host behavioral analysis, the difference D between
source ports and destination ports for a particular ﬂow must
be less than threshold. Moreover the inter-arrival packet time
measures are used in detecting VoIP ﬂows.The main ﬂaw in
this approach is that it could not provide a real time solution
for VoIP detection; as ﬁrst you have to calculate the number
of source and destination ports used for a particular source
destination pair. In some cases it had false positive ratio more
than 10% which is still large. Moreover it could not handle
VoIP into IPSec tunnel. Fauzia and Uzma (Idrees and
Aslam Khan, 2008) separate out VoIP trafﬁc by using trafﬁc
feature, that are difﬁcult to alter, such as packet interval time,
packet sizes, rate of exchange. This technique only considered
UDP trafﬁc. Some VoIP applications may use TCP for voice
transmission when UDP is blocked and SSL/TLS VoIP also
uses TCP. Moreover there are many VoIP applications that
transmit voice packets of size less than 100 bytes, so in this
case this statistical technique could not detect that VoIP ﬂows.
It could also not handle IPSec VoIP. Freire and Ziviani
describe a scheme (Freire et al., 2008) that detects VoIP calls
hidden in web trafﬁc, on port 80 and 443, by using web
request size, web response size, inter arrival time between
requests, no. of requests per page, page retrieval time. They
use goodness-of-ﬁtness test, Kolmogorov–Smirnov (KS) dis-
tance and chi-square values and obtain metrics to identify
VoIP in web trafﬁc. This technique has good results but It
is speciﬁc to VoIP hidden in the web trafﬁc using port
80,443. It only supports the http version 1.1. Moreover it is
also not real time detection and need more prior data for anal-
ysis and detection.VoIP hidden in IPSec tunnel could not be
detected by Freire et al. (2008). Yildirim and Radcliffeproposed a statistical technique (Yildirim and Radcliffe,
2010) to identify the protocol such as VoIP within encrypted
tunnel by using probabilistic information and packet size dis-
tribution (PSD) of ﬂows. This technique only considered one
VoIP application (Skype) for analysis and testing. Only 3
voice codec schemes are analyzed by this technique.
Moreover, only packet size is used as a basic parameter to
identify the VoIP trafﬁc so more false positives. Similar to
other techniques, this technique could also not used for
IPSec tunneled VoIP. Ying-Dar and Chun-NanLu (Lin
et al., 2009) also proposed a generic technique to classify the
network trafﬁc into different application types by using packet
size distribution (PSD) and port association. In the case of
VoIP classiﬁcation it only analyzed two VoIP applications
i.e. MSN and Skype. similar to previous technique this tech-
nique also only depends on packet sizes, so results might
not be more accurate. Results show that in the case of MSN
VoIP detection, there is 9% false positive and in the case of
Skype VoIP detection, there is 18% false negative. Riyad
(Alshammari and Zincir-Heywood, 2010) detects VoIP trafﬁc
by using ﬂow features such as size and time and evaluates
three different machine learning (ML) techniques namely
C4.5, AdaBoost, and SBB-GP. This technique only analyzed
Gtalk and Skype, other important application such as
Yahoo, MSN, Zfone etc are given no importance. All results
are speciﬁc to these two applications. Toshiya Okabe pro-
posed ﬂow level behavior (FLB) VoIP detection technique in
Okabe et al. (2006) that uses packet size and inter arrival time
to measure average, median, and distribution for VoIP detec-
tion. Yildirim and Radcliffe (2010) proposed a simplest statis-
tical technique for VoIP identiﬁcation hidden in IPSec tunnel
by considering packet size only. This technique identiﬁes VoIP
packets whose packet size lies within a certain limit. It can not
be used for detection purpose to block VoIP calls as it has
more false positives and false negatives. The latest work done
in this ﬁeld using statistical analysis by Branch and But (2012).
They described the construction and performance of classiﬁers
able to identify variable rate VoIP ﬂows. They use machine
learning techniques to classify VoIP ﬂows by constructing
C4.5 decision tree using J48 algorithm as does by Li et al.
(2007) and Alshammari and Zincir-Heywood (2010). They
use ﬂow statistical parameters such as minimum mean of
packet length at each direction, normalized ratio of the num-
ber of bytes in both direction, and absolute one packet differ-
ence as input to the classiﬁer. The technique (Branch and But,
2012) although needs just part of the ﬂow for voice classiﬁca-
tion but it still needs to train the classiﬁer. Moreover this tech-
nique could only be implemented at two way interface only as
it needs both directions trafﬁc for VoIP ﬂows detection. The
authors of the paper analyzed and tested only two VoIP appli-
cations traces which are not enough. Table 1 shows the work
done by using statistical methods, features and parameters,
and techniques used and VoIP applications for which the sys-
tem is tested. Table 2 shows comparative study among these
techniques by considering limitations in terms of whether they
are generic (nor dependent on any VoIP application/proto-
col), whether they can be implemented at one-way or two-
way interface, whether they can detect IPSec hidden VoIP,
and whether they are speciﬁc to VoIP detection. We have seen,
these statistical techniques neither meet the requirements to be
generic, efﬁcient, more accurate, independent from VoIP
applications/protocols and security mechanisms nor they are
Table 1 Modern statistical techniques.
Ref. Year Parameters used Techniques used VoIP Applications
tested
RGIPVTF (Branch and But, 2012) 2012 X pkt-size (each direction),
Normalized
ratio (both direction), packet diﬀ.
C4.5 Decision tree, J48
algorithm
Skype, Gtalk
HFBA (Li et al., 2010) 2010 No.of ports, packet time Diﬀerence of no. of ports,
ratio of small and large inter-
packet arrival times
Skype
PDF-PSD (Yildirim and Radcliﬀe,
2010)
2010 Packet size, packet time Prob. density function,
Packet size distribution (PSD)
Skype
IPSec VoIP detection (Yildirim and
Radcliﬀe, 2010)
2010 Packet size packet size rang only Own VoIP setup
C4.5, AdaBoost, SBB-GB
(Alshammari and Zincir-Heywood,
2010)
2010 Packet size, time, mean, S.D,
max-time, etc.
C4.5, adaBoost, SBB-GB
classiﬁers
Gtalk, Skype
PSD-PA (Lin et al., 2009) 2009 Packet size, ports PSD, ports Skype, MSN
K-means classiﬁer (Maiolini et al.,
2009)
2009 Packet size, time, direction K-means classiﬁer (only 1st few
pkts)
Nil
Statistical thresholds (Idrees and
Aslam Khan, 2008)
2008 Packet size, exchange rate Mean and S.D by threshold Skype, MSN, Yahoo,
Gtalk
VoIP hidden in web traﬃc (Freire
et al., 2008)
2008 Request and respond size, time,
no. of requests
Goodness-to-ﬁtness test, KS
distance, chi-square
Skype, Gtalk
J48, REP tree (Li et al., 2007) 2007 Packet size, time, ﬂow duration J48, REP tree MSN, Skype
FLB (Okabe et al., 2006) 2006 Packet size, time Flow level behavior (FLB) SIPSoftphone, Netmeeting,
Skype, Kaza
Table 2 Modern statistical techniques.
Technique Generic (w.r.t VoIP
application or protocol)?
Supported interface
(one-way, two-way)
IPSec VoIP
detection?
Speciﬁc to VoIP
detection?
HFBA (Li et al., 2010) Yes Two-way No Yes
Statistical thresholds (Idrees and Aslam Khan, 2008) Yes Both No Yes
VoIP hidden in web traﬃc (Freire et al., 2008) No Two-way No Yes
IPSec VoIP detection (Yildirim and Radcliﬀe, 2010) Yes Both Yes Yes
K-means classiﬁer (Maiolini et al., 2009) No Two-way No No
PDF-PSD (Yildirim and Radcliﬀe, 2010) Yes Both Yes Yes
PSD-PA (Lin et al., 2009) Yes Two-way No No
J48, REP tree (Li et al., 2007) Yes Both No No
C4.5, AdaBoost, SBB-GB
(Alshammari and Zincir-Heywood, 2010)
No Two-way Yes Yes
FLB (Okabe et al., 2006) No. (speciﬁc to some
VoIP applications)
Both No Yes
RGIPVTF (Branch and But, 2012) yes Two-way yes (but not tested) Yes
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gateways to either block or prioritize VoIP calls. Here in this
paper, we are going to address these limitations.
3. Datasets collection
Datasets are collected at different time from different environ-
ments and locations for analysis and testing. The datasets are
collected from (1) NUST SEECS WISNET lab (2) home users’
computers (3) Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA)
and Pakistan Telecommunication Limited (PTCL) gateways,
that include trafﬁc from wired as well as wireless networks
such as EDGE, GPRS, etc. (4) sample traces downloaded fromWireshark site (http://wiki.wireshark.org/SampleCaptures)
(5) Skype voice traces downloaded from tstat site
(http://tstat.tlc.polito.it/traces-skype.shtml) (6) by making
own simple encrypted and non encrypted VoIP setups using
Asterisk as VoIP server and Zfone, X-lite, Eyebeam, Blink
as client. Table 3 presents the information of our own VoIP
setup traces such as minimum size, number of captured traces,
and minimum duration of trace. e.g. ‘‘C-SRTP-RTP’’ in
Table 3 shows four conversations of two VoIP clients in which
one VoIP client trafﬁc is encrypted by SRTP and other client
trafﬁc is un-encrypted and minimum size of these conversa-
tions is .5MB and duration is 82 s. Moreover traces of VoIP
that use SSL/TLS and IPSec tunnels are also captured. Voice
Table 3 VoIP setup traces.
Trace Size (MB) No. of ﬁles Duration (sec)
A-RTP-RTP 1.5 4 478
B-RTP-SRTP .5 4 66
C-SRTP-RTP .5 4 82
D-SRTP-SRTP 1.5 4 151
Zfone-X-lite .25 1 32
Asterisk voice 4.5 1 151
Table 4 VoIP testing traces.
VoIP
application
Versions Min-size
(MB)
Min-duration
(sec)
Gtalk 1.0.0.104 beta, Gmail
voice
3 504
Skype 4.0.0.215, 5.5.0.119,
5.5.0.124
3 664
MSN 7.5,8.0,15.4 1 88
Yahoo (SSL
tunnel)
9.0, 10.1, beta, 11.0 2 332
Oovoo 3.5.9.4 4 123
QQ messenger 1.6 1 57
Trillian IM 3.1.12.0 2 133
Mix VoIP 40 10,714
Table 6 Skype tstat traces.
Trace Codec Transport
protocol
Size
(MB)
Duration
(sec)
E2E-140606-1 G729 UDP 8 905
E2E-140606-2 iLBC UDP 11 1003
E2E-140606-3 iSAC UDP 12 1116
SkypeOut-
260906-1
G729 TCP 9 919
SkypeOut-
260906-2
G729 UDP 7 910
Internet-E2X TCP 212 343,562
Internet-E2O UDP 264 343,562
Internet-E2E UDP 3.5GB 344,700
Internet-SIG UDP 6GB 344,700
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beta version, Skype 4.0.0.215, Skype 5.5.0.119 and Skype
5.5.59.124, Yahoo 9.0.0.2152, Yahoo 10.0, Yahoo beta,
Yahoo 11.0, MSN 7.0, MSN 8.5, MSN 15.4.3538.0513 and
Windows Live messenger are taken for analysis. These trafﬁc
traces are described in Table 4. non-VoIP applications traces
are also captured such as YouTube, torrents, antivirus
updates, videos, online live TVs, audio songs, FTP downloads,
online games, web mails such as Gmail, Yahoo mail, Hotmail,
Bluetooth, chatting, DNS trafﬁc, document retrieval, frame
relay, remote access, SMTP, SSH, and telnet-remote access
traces. Moreover mixture of VoIP and non-VoIP trafﬁc traces
are also collected for testing. Main non-VoIP applications
traces that are analyzed and tested are described in Table 5.
The details of tstat Skype traces (http://
tstat.tlc.polito.it/traces-skype.shtml) are presented in Table 6
with codec, transport protocols used, size of trace, and timeTable 5 non-VoIP traces.
Trace Min-size
(MB)
No. of
ﬁles
Min-duration
(sec)
Gmail-Yahoomail 3 5 156
Hotmail 3 3 101
Mix (VoIP-NonVoIP) 65 4 1023
NonVoIP-mix 112 6 1331
Torrent-YouTube-
Gmail
1 1 431
YouTube 9 6 97
Online TV 2 1 88
Bittorent 150 5 2043duration of the trafﬁc. These traces contain both UDP and
TCP voice conversations. Moreover large size dumps are col-
lected from PTA gateway of 2-4 GB, and hundreds of dumps
of 1GB from PTCL gateway. These large traces include trafﬁc
from wired as well as wireless networks.
4. Statistical analysis
Our aim of statistical analysis is to ﬁnd distinct threshold val-
ues of ﬂow statistical parameters for voice ﬂows. Wireshark is
used for simple analysis and capturing trafﬁc. C language is
used for complex analysis. The code is written in C using
Winpcap 4.1.2 library to analyze the ofﬂine as well as online
trafﬁc. The proposed algorithm is also developed in C using
Winpcap. The statistical analyses are performed on traces by
two ways; ﬁrstly, the statistical parameters of each ﬂow are cal-
culated and analyzed for complete session and in the 2nd phase
the statistical parameters are calculated and analyzed by tak-
ing different seconds trafﬁc chunks for each ﬂow. We noticed
that the system could not give better results when we consid-
ered trafﬁc chunks of less than 5 s for each ﬂow but when
we considered trafﬁc chunks of more than 5 s, it tended to
degrade the performance of system. So to maintain the equilib-
rium between accuracy and efﬁciency we chose 5,5 s trafﬁc
chunks for analyzing each ﬂow for VoIP call detection. All
VoIP and non-VoIP applications are statistically analyzed in
this way. Moreover the RTP, SRTP, ZRTP, SSL, TLS,
IPSec voice trafﬁc is deeply analyzed. The trafﬁc of these pro-
tocols is detected by signatures and then analyzed from PTA
and PTCL dumps.
The ﬂow is distinguished by 4 tuples source-IP, destination-
IP, source-port, and destination-port (S-IP, D-IP, S-Port, D-
Port), as every packet has these properties. In the case of
IPSec, the transport layer information is encrypted so the ﬂow
is distinguished by 3 tuples source-IP, destination-IP, and secu-
rity parameters index (S-IP, D-IP, SPI). Main statistical
parameters that are used to analyze each ﬂow are packet rate
(pkt-rate) in packets/sec, mean (X) and standard deviation
(S.D) of packets’ sizes in bytes, and maximum difference
between the current and previous packets’ time for all packets
(max-diff-time), mean and standard deviation of the difference
between the current and previous packet time (X (diff-time),
S.D (diff-time)), all in seconds. IP layer packet size is consid-
ered for all measurements.
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which affect the quality of voice. Voice packet total delay con-
sists of packet creation time plus network transmission timeout
plus receiving buffering and decoding time. Latency is the
delay in packet delivery. Variation in delays is called jitter.
More latency, jitter and packet loss degrade the quality of
voice. The total delay of a voice packet is increasing function
of packet size. If the packet size is larger, more voice is encoded
in a packet; it will take more packet creation time, transmis-
sion time, and decoding time, resultantly the total packet delay
is increased. To maintain the quality of voice, the delay should
be bearable and the packet size should also be within a limit.
Moreover in the case of voice, the loss of large size packet
means the loss of more voice which is not tolerant. Due to
these facts the voice packet length must lie within a certain
limit to maintain the quality. Jitter also affects the quality of
voice as larger variation in packet delays does not produce
clear voice at the receiver side. There should be bearable vari-
ation in delays in the case of voice packets to maintain voice
quality. By considering these facts, we use IP layer packet size
as the basic parameters for statistical analysis. We analyzed the
ﬂows for packet size distribution (PSD) and packet rates. The
packet size distribution and packet rate of different VoIP
applications are shown in Fig. 2. We observed that the voice
ﬂows has higher packet rates, so we considered the non-
VoIP applications that have higher packet rates and then ana-
lyzed them by considering PSD, shown in Fig. 3. We noticed
that PSD graph for both VoIP ﬂows and non-VoIP ﬂows, that
have higher packet rates, is quite different. Hence on the basis
of these analyses we chose ﬁrst three parameters i.e. packet
rate, X (size) and S.D (size) as statistical parameters for
VoIP trafﬁc analysis to distinguish voice ﬂows. Moreover the
ITU-T recommends to capsulate 20-30 ms voice in a packet
for better performance and quality assurance. It shortens
packet size and increases packet rate i.e. more packets per sec-
ond as compared to other applications. This is also another
reason to choose packet rate as parameter for statistical anal-
ysis. It is also a fact that voice has a continuous behavior as the
voice packets are continuously sent when a person speaks on
VoIP phone. Very short time is elapsed between the currentFig. 2 Packet rate and packet size distriand previous voice packets. We consider this fact and take
max-diff-time, X (diff-time), and S.D (diff-time) as statistical
measures for time-based analysis to distinguish voice ﬂows.
The parameters and corresponding values ranges for voice
ﬂows on different VoIP application are shown in Table 7 by
considering 5,5 s chunks of trafﬁc for each ﬂow.
We have also observed that some VoIP applications such as
Gtalk, MSN send small number of packets at the start of the
media session. The range of these packets is 2-15 packets in
ﬁrst 10–15 s. Sometime max-diff-time is quite high i.e. greater
than 1 for ﬁrst or last packet of the ﬂow. In such cases, the
absolute value of difference (X(diff-time)-S.D(diff-time)) also
exceeds from normal range. Other non-VoIP trafﬁc traces such
as YouTube, torrent, antivirus updates, FTP downloads,
online live TVs, mail servers trafﬁc (Gmail, Yahoo mail,
Hotmail), online games traces are also analyzed on these
parameters. The values of statistical parameters are quite dis-
tinctive for both VoIP and non-VoIP ﬂows. So on the basis
of these parameters we can identify VoIP ﬂows efﬁciently
and with higher accuracy.
5. Proposed System
The ﬂow is distinguished by 3 tuples i.e. source IP, destination
IP, security parameters index (S-IP,D-IP, SPI) in the case of
IPsec and 4 tuples i.e. source IP, destination IP, and source
port, destination port (S-IP, D-IP, S-port, D-port) in the case
of all other trafﬁc. On the basis of parameters values’ ranges as
in Table 7, detailed statistical analysis of different VoIP appli-
cations presented in Section 4, and study of voice codecs, stan-
dards, and facts about voice transmission, we deﬁned 8 rules
for VoIP detection. These rules are:
1. pkt-rate > 13 packets/sec
2. 56 6 X (size) 6 210 bytes
3. 0 6 S.D (size) 6 75 bytes
4. X (size) P S.D (size)
5. 0 < max-diff-time 6 .8 s
6. 0 < X (diff-time) 6 .09 sbution of different VoIP applications.
Fig. 3 Packet rate and packet size distribution of non-VoIP applications.
Table 7 Statistical parameters values ranges for VoIP application considering 5,5 s trafﬁc for each ﬂow.
Trace Pkt-rate X (size) S.D (size) Max-diﬀ-time X (diﬀ-time) S.D. (diﬀ-time) j X-S.D.j
(diﬀ-time)
Skype 16–50 60–140 .38–27 .075–.393 .019–.061 .008–.12 0–.07
Gtalk 17–37 90–170 5–65 .101–.426 .027–.056 .011–.578 0–.02
Yahoo 12–37 64–170 1–75 .065–.49 .026–.086 .010–.073 0–.03
MSN 17–50 120–140 05–20 .06–.74 .020–.058 .005–.055 0–.02
Asterisk traces with Zfone, X-lie, Eyebeam clients 17–30 190–210 0–40 .02–.41 .010–.046 .05–.49 0–.032
Threshold-based generic scheme for encrypted and tunneled Voice Flows Detection over IP Networks 3117. 0 < S.D (diff-time) 6 .25 s
8. 0 < jX -S.D (diff-time) j6 .1 s
A ﬂow is a VoIP ﬂow if and only if the ﬁrst 4 rules are true and
at least 3 rules from the last 4 rules are satisﬁed, because of the
ﬁnding presented in the last paragraph of Section 4. A ﬂow is
conﬁrmed non-VoIP if the rate rule is true but any one rule
from the rules 2, 3, 4 is false. If the ﬂow is neither VoIP nor
non-VoIP then it is either a suspected ﬂow or not to be decided
yet. If the ﬂow is suspected for ﬁrst 5 s trafﬁc then it is reinves-
tigated for next 5 s trafﬁc and if it remains suspected 3 times
then it is detected as non-VoIP ﬂow. The algorithm pseudo
code is:
1. For each packet determine the ﬂow to which it belongs. If
no ﬂow is found then register it as a new ﬂow uniquely dis-
tinguished by (S-IP,D-IP,SPI) for IPSec or by (S-IP,D-
IP,S-port,D-port) for other trafﬁc and calculate
parameters.
2. Capture the ﬁrst 80 packets or all the packets within 5 s for
each ﬂow.
3. Investigate the ﬂow for VoIP only if the ﬂow total no. of
packets > 65 within 5 s.(a) If (all ﬁrst 4 rules == true) and if (at least 3 rule
from rule 5, 6, 7, 8 == true) then the ﬂow is VoIP ﬂow.(b) If (all ﬁrst 4 rules == true) and if (less than 3 rule
from rule 5, 6, 7, 8 == true) then the ﬂow is suspected.
Suspected ﬂows are reinvestigated for next phase (next
5 s trafﬁc).
(c) If (rate rule == true) and if (any rule from rule 2, 3,
4 == false) then the ﬂow is conﬁrmed non-VoIP.
(d) If (ﬂow suspectedP3 time) then it is non-VoIP ﬂow.
6. Evaluation and comparison
We evaluate our system with respect to accuracy and efﬁciency
and by comparing results with the existing systems. We use
typical parameters such as true positive (TP), false negative
(FN), true negative (TN), false positive (FP), direct rate
(DR), and false positive rate (FPR) that are mostly used for
measuring accuracy of a system. TP is the measure of ﬂows
that are correctly identiﬁed as VoIP ﬂows. FN is the measure
of ﬂows that are incorrectly identiﬁed as non-VoIP ﬂows. TN
is the measure of ﬂows that are correctly identiﬁed as non-
VoIP ﬂows. FP is the measure of ﬂows that are incorrectly
identiﬁed as VoIP ﬂows. DR reﬂects how much VoIP ﬂows
are correctly identiﬁed as VoIP ﬂows and calculated by Eq.
1. FPR reﬂects how much non-VoIP ﬂows incorrectly identi-
ﬁed as VoIP ﬂows and calculated by Eq. 2. The ideal solution
is that which has 100% DR and 0% FPR.
Table 8 Overall accuracy results.
Traﬃc DR= TP/
(TP + FN)%
FPR= FP/
(FP + TN)%
Real-time traﬃc 92.5 .0002
Oﬀ-line traﬃc 96.56 .00013
Own-VoIP-setup traces 100 –
Tstat Skype traces 97.78 –
Overall 97.54 .00015
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FPR ¼ FP=ðFPþ TNÞ ð2Þ
Table 8 shows overall accuracy results on all datasets pre-
sented inSection3 such as real time trafﬁc, ofﬂine captured traces,
sample trafﬁc (http://wiki.wireshark.org/SampleCaptures), and
tstat Skype traces (http://tstat.tlc.polito.it/traces-skype.shtml)
as well as on mixture of VoIP and non-VoIP trafﬁc traces. Our
system has 97.54 % DR which is quite higher and .00015%
FPRwhich is quite lower. Accuracy results on VoIP applications
traces are shown in Fig. 4(a). Gtalk, MSN, Zfone, X-lite, and
Asterisk with Eyebeam and Blink as clients give 100% TP and
0% FN. Only Skype and Yahoo has TP bit lower than 100%.
Accuracy results on tstat Skype traces are shown in Fig. 4(b).
Only Skype voice trace ‘‘SKYPE-TCP-E2X’’, that uses TCP,
has quite higher FN nearer to 17% but overall accuracy perfor-
mance on these traces is better. The results on different voice
codecs are shown in Fig. 4(c). All these codecs have 100% TP.
The efﬁciency is measured in terms of VoIP ﬂow detection
time. The detection time of voice calls is less than 6 s; as we
only consider the small part of the ﬂow trafﬁc (i.e. ﬁrst 60
packets or packets within 5 s for each ﬂow) for VoIP detection.
Fig. 4(d) shows the average detection time of voice ﬂows onFig. 4 Testidifferent VoIP applications. These results are taken from real
time implementation by communicating voice using different
VoIP applications. MSN, Yahoo, and Skype voice ﬂows are
detected within 5 s and Gtalk, Gmail voice ﬂows take more
than 5 s to be identiﬁed as they send less numbers of packets
within 5 s.
We compare our technique with host and ﬂow behavior
analysis (HFBA) technique (Li et al., 2010), threshold-based
detection (Idrees and Aslam Khan, 2008), and IPSec tunneled
VoIP detection (Yildirim and Radcliffe, 2010), ﬂow level
behavior (FLB) technique (Okabe et al., 2006) in terms of
TP, FP, and FN. HFBA (Li et al., 2010), threshold-based
detection (Idrees and Aslam Khan, 2008), and FLB (Okabe
et al., 2006) techniques gave more importance to Skype voice
trafﬁc in analysis and testing, so we consider larger size 3.5
GB tstat Skype trace ‘‘Internet-Skype-UDP-E2E’’ (http://
tstat.tlc.polito.it/traces-skype.shtml) for comparing these
VoIP detection techniques with our technique. Table 9 shows
results and comparison on tstat 3.5GB Skype trace. Our tech-
nique is a threshold-based statistical analysis-based technique
which can also detect IPSec tunneled voice calls, so we com-
pare our technique with threshold-based VoIP detection tech-
nique presented in Idrees and Aslam Khan (2008) and IPSec
VoIP detection technique(Yildirim and Radcliffe, 2010) on
all datasets collected and presented in Section 3. Table 10
shows overall comparison.
We have observed that our system performance is better
than existing techniques with respect to accuracy and efﬁ-
ciency. Moreover our system is generic that can detect VoIP
trafﬁc regardless of the VoIP application, protocol, codec,
and security mechanism. The system can detect tunneled
VoIP such as SSL/TLS and IPSec VoIP. The system can be
implemented at one-way or two way network interface. It
meets the need of telecommunication authorities and ISPsng results.
Table 9 Comparison between our technique and existing
techniques w.r.t accuracy on 3.5 GB tstat Skype traces.
Technique TP% FN%
Host and ﬂow behavior analysis (HFBA)
(Li et al., 2010)
90.28 9.72
Threshold-based detection
(Idrees and Aslam Khan, 2008)
79.2 20.8
Flow level behavior (FLB)
(Okabe et al., 2006)
55.6 44.4
Our technique 98.86 1.14
Table 10 Comparison between our technique and existing
techniques w.r.t accuracy on different captured traces.
Technique Oﬄine traﬃc
TP % FP
Threshold based detection
(Idrees and Aslam Khan, 2008)
35.7 .0001
IPSec VoIP detection
(Yildirim and Radcliﬀe, 2010)
73 25
Our technique 96.56 .00013
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test our solution on many traces of more than 10 VoIP appli-
cations which are more than others techniques tested applica-
tions. Moreover our solution is designed after detailed
statistical analysis of VoIP applications, voice codecs, and
voice standards. So we assume that the accuracy and efﬁciency
results will be quite similar on other VoIP applications as on
the tested applications.
7. Conclusion
In this paper we have proposed a generic, robust, efﬁcient, and
practically implementable statistical analysis-based solution to
identify encrypted, non-encrypted, or tunneled VoIP media
ﬂows using threshold values of ﬂow statistical parameters by
giving one-way or two-way trafﬁc. So it is the best choice for
telecommunication authorities and ISPs to detect VoIP calls.
The system is tested on large datasets of different VoIP and
non-VoIP trafﬁc. The comparisons and results show that our
technique is the best among all the existing techniques. This
technique has 97.54% TP and .00015% FP.
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